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EVIDENCE
PHYSICIAN'S OPINION BASED ON UNSUPPORTED
INFERENCES
Plaintiff sued to recover double indemnity under a life and acci-
dent policy. The body of the insured was found floating on the sur-
face of a lake after she had gone out in a boat. Nothing was known
concerning the cause of the accident. The judge admitted testimony
of a doctor for defendant that death could or might have been due
to a chronic illness suffered by the insured. After verdict for the
defendant, plaintiff moved for, and obtained, a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. Defendant appealed. Held, judgment affirmed.
There was no evidence submitted by defendant which could lawfully
be considered by the jury. Kanne v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,
310 Ill. App. 524, 54 N.E. (2d) 732 (1941).
The court is authorized under Illinois statutes to determine,
on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, whether or not
there was evidence which could be considered by the jury. iLL. REV.
STAT. (1937) c. 110, § 192 (3) a, Malewskz v. Machiewtch, 282 Ill. App.
593 (1936). When a person is found dead in the water and nothing more
is known concerning the cause of death, a pnima facie case of death
by accidental means within the meaning of the insurance policy is es-
tablished- Supreme Council of C. B. L. v. Boyle, 10 Ind. App. 301,
37 N.E. 1105 (1894) There was no evidence presented to show that
the insured had ever suffered from any illness. Expert opinion can-
not be based on facts which have not been presented. Souza v. United
Electric Rys. Co., 51 R.I. 124, 152 Atl.419 (1913). The doctor based
his opinion upon the fact that the body was found floating on the
surface of the water, an indication that death occurred before the
body entered the water. It has been held, however, that the failure
of a body to sink, although not normal in cases of drowning, does not
necessarily raise a presumption of death from disease. Burnham v.
Interstate Casualty Co., 117 Mich. 142, 75 N.W. 445 (1898). Further-
more, an expert's opinion cannot be admitted for the consideration of
the jury when it is a mere surimse, guess or conjecture. Wallace v.
Yudelson, 244 Del.App. 320 (1927).
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
POWER OF FEDERAL COURT TO ENJOIN ENFORCEMENT
OF STATE INJUNCTION
Plaintiff brought action under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act in the Federal District court of Missouri for the wrongful death
of her husband, an employee of the defendant railroad. The accident
occurred in North Carolina, and the witnesses and the plaintiff were
residents of Tennessee. Upon defendant's petition, a Tennessee court
of equity enjoined the plaintiff from further pursuing the case in
any courts other than those sitting in Tennessee or North Carolina
on the ground that the expense in transporting witnesses could this
be avoided. Upon plaintiff's petition the Missouri federal court ren-
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dered an interlocutory decree forbidding further proceedings in the
Tennessee court. The decree being affirmed in the Circuit Court of
Appeals, the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. Held, reversed,
issuance of such injunction was contrary to Section 265 of the Judicial
Code.,
The Federal Employers' Liability Act 2 provides that a person
can elect to sue in state or federal courts either at the place (1)
where the plaintiff resides, (2) where the cause of action arose, or
(3) where the defendant is doing business. Since the defendant in
the instant case was doing business within Missouri, there is no
question but that the federal district court there had jurisdiction
over the cause of action.
Did the Missouri federal court, in seeking to enforce its juris-
diction, have the power to enjoin the Tennessee court from enforcing
its injunction? The Judiciary Act of 1793, Section 265,3 has been
construed to prohibit federal courts from enjoining proceedings in
state courts except in bankruptcy cases 4 and in rem cases in which
the state court is attempting to interfere with property already in
the custody of the federal court.5  Three of the justices of the
United States Supreme Court have argued that a third exception should
arise when a claim in controversy in a state court has previously
been litigated in a federal court, but the majority of the court
has held otherwise. 6 Hence, it is not surprising that the court in
the instant case failed to establish the fourth exception for which
the plaintiff was arguing; namely-that a federal court may stay
proceedings in a state court when the federal court has already as-
sumed jurisdiction under the express provisions of a federal statute.
At first blush this result appears to esmasculate the venue
provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, for it throws
the plaintiff out of the federal court in Missouri, a court authorized
by the statute to take jurisdiction. However, the court has only
1 Southern Ry. v. Painter, 62 Sup. Ct. 154 (1941).
234 STAT. 65 (1908) as amended by 36 STAT. 291 (1910), 45 u.s.c.
§ 51-59 (1928).
'I STAT. 335 (1793), 28 U.s.c. § 379 (1928).
4 Jud. Code, § 265, 28 u.s.c.A., § 379. Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.,
62 S. Ct. 139 (1941). Cf. Isaac v. Hobb Tie and Lumber Co.,
51 S. Ct. 270 (1931), noted in 7 Ind. L. J. 502 (1932).
G Bryant v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 92 F. (2d) 569 (C.C.A. 2d,
1937); Chicago M. St. P. Ry. v. Schendel, 292 Fed. 326 (C.C.A.
8th 1923); McConnell v. Thomson, 213 Ind. 16, 11 N.E. (2d) 183
(1937); ". . . . (the statute) does not prevent federal courts
from enjoining the institution in the state courts of proceedings
to enforce local statutes which are repugnant to the constitution
of the United States, . . . or prevent them of depriving a party.
. of the benefits of a judgment obtained in a state court
where its enforcement will be contrary to recognized principles of
equity and the standard of good conscience." Wells Fargo v.
Taylor, 245 U. S. 175, 183 (1920). See Field v. Kansas City Re-
fining Co., 9 F. (2d) 213 (1925); Hayes v. Columbus, L. & M.
Ry. Co., 67 Fed. 630 (N.D. Ohio 1895); Dickinson v. Willis, 239
Fed. 171 (S. D. Iowa 1916).
6 Toucey v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 62 S. Ct. 139 (1941).
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decreed that the federal court had no power to enjoin the state
proceeding. The question of the power of the Tennessee court to
issue the original injunction remains unanswered. On the strength
of a recent decision 7 and a long line of cases s holding that state
courts cannot enjoin persons, even if they are under the court's
personal jurisdiction, from further prosecution of litigation in a
federal court which has properly taken jurisdiction, one must conclude
that an appeal from the Tennessee injunction would result in a re-
versal and the reinstatement of the plaintiff in federal court.9
The cases furnish vivid illustration of a doctrine that state and
federal jurisdictions are independent, 10 and a demonstration of the
reluctance of the Supreme Court to permit either federal or state
courts to interfere with the proceedings of the other. The doctrine
is a striking limitation on the powers of both federal and state courts,
for it denies to them the power to grant injunction in certain situations,
even though they possess jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
"Baltimore and Ohio R. R. v. Kepner, 62 Sup. Ct. 6 (1941). Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, in a dissenting opinion in which he was joined
by Stone and Roberts, argued that the state should have been
permitted to enjoin federal proceedings on the general equity
grounds of added expense and inconvenience to the defendant. He
Ointed out that since a state court may decline jurisdiction as a
rum non conveniens, it should be able to enjoin its residentsfrom suing in a forum non conveniens, i. e., where the litigation
will be vexatious.
8 Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166 (U.S. 1867); United States
v. Keokuk, 6 Wall. 514 (U.S. 1867); See, Oklahoma Packing Co.
v. Oklahoma Gas and Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1939).
0 Peculiarly enough, state courts have generally enjoined plaintiffs
over whom they have had jurisdiction from bringing suits in for-
eign state courts under the Federal Employers' Liability Act when
the action would be burdensome or expensive. Kern v. Clev., Cin.,
Chi. and St. Louis Ry., 204 Ind. 595, 185 N.E. 456 (1933); Clev.,
Cin., Chi. and St. Louis Ry. v. Shelly, 96 Ind. App. 273, 170 N.E.
328 (1932); Reed's Adm'x v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 182 Ky. 455, 206 S.
W. 794 (1918) ; Ex parte Crandall, 52 F. (2d) 650 (S.D. Ind. 1931).
But they have refused to enjoin plaintiffs under their jurisdiction
from bringing action under the statute in the federal courts
located in another state. McConnell v. Thompson, 213 Ind. 16, 8
N. E. (2d) 986, 11 N.E. (2d) 183 (1937); cf. Pitcairn v. Drum-
mond, 23 N.E. (2d) 21 (Ind. 1939) ; noted in (1941) 16 IND. L. J. 111,
and supporting the proposition that state courts have no juris-
diction to control the situs of action against federal receivers
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Because the Supreme
Court of the United States has held that the jurisdiction of state
courts and federal courts under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act is concurrent. Douglas v. N.Y., New Haven, and Hartford Ry.
Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929), and because of the long-established
equitable doctrine of forum non conveniens, the policy of enjoining
actions in foreign state courts and not in foreign federal courts
has provoked much criticism. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. v. Kepner,
62 S. Ct. 6 (1941). (dissenting opinion cited in note 7, supra).
See Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-Ameri-
can Law (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 1.
1 oMcKim v. Voorhies, 7 Cranch 279 (U.S. 1812) ; See Riggs v. Johnson
County, 6 Wall. 166, 195 (U.S. 1867); Central National Bank v.
Stevens, 169 U.S. 432, 460 (1898).
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